chore(deps): update github artifact actions (major)#3442
Conversation
b88097c to
0aea0eb
Compare
cc8eb97 to
3f90632
Compare
3f90632 to
4ff97df
Compare
4ff97df to
4d5e4af
Compare
4d5e4af to
2163afe
Compare
c8b66ba to
0dceac7
Compare
0dceac7 to
1a6ce0e
Compare
1a6ce0e to
35bd267
Compare
45c23eb to
50c9265
Compare
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Stale comment
Security Review: No issues found
This PR updates first-party GitHub artifact actions (
actions/upload-artifactv4→v7,actions/download-artifactv4→v8) in the CI workflow. These are maintained by the GitHubactions/organization.
- No new permissions, secrets, or workflow triggers are introduced.
- No new code paths or logic changes — only version strings in
uses:directives.- The existing pattern of using mutable major-version tags (rather than SHA-pinned refs) is unchanged; this is a pre-existing posture, not a new risk from this PR.
No security findings to report.
Sent by Cursor Automation: Find vulnerabilities
50c9265 to
5313cb6
Compare
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Stale comment
Security Review: No Vulnerabilities Found
PR: Dependency update of GitHub artifact actions (
actions/upload-artifactv4 → v7,actions/download-artifactv4 → v8)Scope: Single file changed (
.github/workflows/dev.yml) — version bumps only, no logic changes.Assessment:
- Both
actions/upload-artifactandactions/download-artifactare first-party GitHub Actions maintained by theactions/organization. The referenced versions (v7.0.1 and v8.0.1 respectively) are legitimate, published releases.- The
download-artifact@v8update actually improves security posture: it now defaultsdigest-mismatchtoerror, enforcing artifact integrity checks that were previously only warnings.- The use of mutable major-version tags (
@v7,@v8) follows the same pattern as the previous@v4references — this is not a new risk introduced by the PR.- No injection risks, secret leakage, permission changes, or supply-chain concerns identified.
Result: Clean — no findings.
Sent by Cursor Automation: Find vulnerabilities
5313cb6 to
ab0cd29
Compare
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Stale comment
Security Review: No Issues Found
This PR bumps two first-party GitHub Actions (
actions/upload-artifactv4 → v7,actions/download-artifactv4 → v8) in.github/workflows/dev.yml. Both are official, verified releases from theactionsorganization.Supply-chain risk: Low. These are first-party GitHub Actions with verified signatures. The use of major version tags (e.g.,
v7,v8) rather than pinned SHAs is consistent with the existing pattern and is standard for official actions.Security improvement:
download-artifact@v8now defaultsdigest-mismatchbehavior toerror, which strengthens artifact integrity checks.No new permissions, secrets exposure, code execution paths, or injection vectors are introduced by this change.
Sent by Cursor Automation: Find vulnerabilities
ab0cd29 to
aea6999
Compare
aea6999 to
95a1bf0
Compare
cc949e3 to
8f71eda
Compare
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Stale comment
Security review (automation)
Scope:
.github/workflows/dev.ymlonly bumps first-party GitHub actions:actions/upload-artifact@v4→@v7andactions/download-artifact@v4→@v8. No workflow logic,permissions, triggers, or step inputs (name,path, etc.) were changed in this diff.Findings: None rated medium or higher.
Analysis (concise):
- Injection / SSRF / secrets: These edits only change action major versions; they do not introduce new attacker-controlled sinks or logging.
- Authn/authz: Unchanged; deploy jobs remain gated with
if: github.repository_owner == 'semaphoreui'.- Supply chain: Still
actions/*maintained by GitHub; same trust model as the prior@v4pins.download-artifactv8 tightens integrity handling (hash mismatch defaults to error per upstream release notes), which is security-positive rather than a regression.Prior automation threads: Cleaned up so this assessment is the active one.
Slack (paste-ready): PR 3442 security review: clean — dependency-only bump to official
upload-artifact/download-artifactmajors; no new medium+ issues identified.Sent by Cursor Automation: Find vulnerabilities
8f71eda to
938d62b
Compare
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Stale comment
Security review (automation)
Scope:
.github/workflows/dev.ymlonly —actions/upload-artifactv4→v7 andactions/download-artifactv4→v8.Outcome: No medium, high, or critical issues identified in the changed lines.
Notes: Artifact
nameandpathremain fixed literals (not PR-controlled). Supply-chain trust is unchanged in kind (first-partyactions/*major tags).download-artifactv8 tightens integrity handling (digest mismatch defaults toerror), which is a defensive default rather than a new exposure.Prior automation assessment threads were cleared so this review reflects the current diff only.
Sent by Cursor Automation: Find vulnerabilities
f9c8af3 to
05f86b7
Compare
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Stale comment
Security review (automation)
Scope:
.github/workflows/dev.ymlonly —actions/upload-artifactv4→v7 andactions/download-artifactv4→v8 (nineuses:lines).Outcome: No medium, high, or critical issues identified in the changed lines.
Analysis:
- Injection / SSRF / secrets: Diff changes action major versions only; artifact
name(semaphore) andpath(bin/semaphore) remain fixed literals with no PR-controlled inputs.- Authn/authz: Unchanged. Deploy jobs still gated with
if: github.repository_owner == 'semaphoreui'; Docker push/login still skipped onpull_request.- Supply chain: Still first-party
actions/*maintained by GitHub; mutable major tags (@v7,@v8) match the prior@v4posture and are not a new risk from this PR.download-artifact@v8defaults digest mismatch toerror, which strengthens artifact integrity vs v4.- Prior automation threads: Validated; no unresolved findings remain applicable.
Slack (paste-ready): PR 3442 security review — clean. Renovate bump of official
upload-artifact/download-artifactmajors indev.ymlonly; no new medium+ vulnerabilities; v8 digest check is a defensive improvement.Sent by Cursor Automation: Find vulnerabilities
Sent by Cursor Automation: Find vulnerabilities
05f86b7 to
619320d
Compare
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Stale comment
Security review (automation)
Scope:
.github/workflows/dev.ymlonly —actions/upload-artifactv4→v7 andactions/download-artifactv4→v8 (nineuses:lines).Outcome: No medium, high, or critical issues identified in the changed lines.
Analysis:
- Injection / SSRF / secrets: Diff changes action major versions only; artifact
name(semaphore) andpath(bin/semaphore) remain fixed literals with no PR-controlled inputs.- Authn/authz: Unchanged. Deploy jobs still gated with
if: github.repository_owner == 'semaphoreui'; Docker push/login still skipped onpull_request.- Supply chain: Still first-party
actions/*maintained by GitHub; mutable major tags (@v7,@v8) match the prior@v4posture and are not a new risk from this PR.download-artifact@v8defaults digest mismatch toerror, which strengthens artifact integrity vs v4.- Prior automation threads: Validated; no unresolved inline findings remain applicable.
Slack (paste-ready): PR 3442 security review — clean. Renovate bump of official
upload-artifact/download-artifactmajors indev.ymlonly; no new medium+ vulnerabilities; v8 digest check is a defensive improvement.Sent by Cursor Automation: Find vulnerabilities
619320d to
a916da8
Compare
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Stale comment
Security review (automation)
Scope:
.github/workflows/dev.ymlonly —actions/upload-artifactv4→v7 andactions/download-artifactv4→v8 (nineuses:lines).Outcome: No medium, high, or critical issues identified in the changed lines.
Analysis:
- Version bumps only; no workflow logic,
permissions, triggers, or step inputs changed.- Artifact names (
semaphore,dredd-hooks) and paths remain hardcoded constants with no attacker-controlled input.archive: false(v7 direct-upload mode) is not enabled; default zip behavior is unchanged.- v8 defaults digest mismatches to
error, which hardens artifact integrity checks rather than weakening them.- Prior path-traversal risk in
download-artifact(CVE-2024-42471, fixed in ≥4.1.3) is not reintroduced; v8 includes current fixes.Supply-chain note (informational, below reporting threshold):
@v7/@v8are floating major tags from the officialactions/org—the same pinning model as the previous@v4pins. No new exploitable attack path from this change alone.Sent by Cursor Automation: Find vulnerabilities
a916da8 to
11a3570
Compare
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Security review (automation)
Scope: .github/workflows/dev.yml only — actions/upload-artifact v4→v7 and actions/download-artifact v4→v8 (14 uses: lines).
Outcome: No medium, high, or critical issues identified in the changed lines.
Notes:
- Artifact names (
semaphore,dredd-hooks) and paths are hardcoded; no attacker-controlled input reaches these actions. - Artifacts are produced and consumed within the same workflow run (
build-local→ downstream jobs); no cross-workflow or external artifact sources. - v8 defaults digest mismatches to
error, which hardens integrity checks versus v4; the prior path-traversal advisory (CVE-2024-42471) was patched in v4.1.3 and remains addressed in v8. - Floating major tags (
@v7/@v8) are pre-existing practice; pinning to commit SHAs would reduce supply-chain risk but is outside this PR’s diff and not a new exposure.
Prior findings: No unresolved automation threads; previous assessments validated — still no exploitable path.
Sent by Cursor Automation: Find vulnerabilities


This PR contains the following updates:
v4→v8v4→v7Release Notes
actions/download-artifact (actions/download-artifact)
v8.0.1Compare Source
What's Changed
Full Changelog: actions/download-artifact@v8...v8.0.1
v8.0.0Compare Source
v8 - What's new
Direct downloads
To support direct uploads in
actions/upload-artifact, the action will no longer attempt to unzip all downloaded files. Instead, the action checks theContent-Typeheader ahead of unzipping and skips non-zipped files. Callers wishing to download a zipped file as-is can also set the newskip-decompressparameter totrue.Enforced checks (breaking)
A previous release introduced digest checks on the download. If a download hash didn't match the expected hash from the server, the action would log a warning. Callers can now configure the behavior on mismatch with the
digest-mismatchparameter. To be secure by default, we are now defaulting the behavior toerrorwhich will fail the workflow run.ESM
To support new versions of the @actions/* packages, we've upgraded the package to ESM.
What's Changed
errorby @danwkennedy in #461Full Changelog: actions/download-artifact@v7...v8.0.0
v8Compare Source
v7.0.0Compare Source
v7 - What's new
Node.js 24
This release updates the runtime to Node.js 24. v6 had preliminary support for Node 24, however this action was by default still running on Node.js 20. Now this action by default will run on Node.js 24.
What's Changed
New Contributors
Full Changelog: actions/download-artifact@v6.0.0...v7.0.0
v7Compare Source
v6.0.0Compare Source
What's Changed
BREAKING CHANGE: this update supports Node
v24.x. This is not a breaking change per-se but we're treating it as such.@actions/artifacttov4.0.0v6.0.0by @danwkennedy in #438New Contributors
Full Changelog: actions/download-artifact@v5...v6.0.0
v6Compare Source
v5.0.0Compare Source
What's Changed
v5.0.0
🚨 Breaking Change
This release fixes an inconsistency in path behavior for single artifact downloads by ID. If you're downloading single artifacts by ID, the output path may change.
What Changed
Previously, single artifact downloads behaved differently depending on how you specified the artifact:
name: my-artifact→ extracted topath/(direct)artifact-ids: 12345→ extracted topath/my-artifact/(nested)Now both methods are consistent:
name: my-artifact→ extracted topath/(unchanged)artifact-ids: 12345→ extracted topath/(fixed - now direct)Migration Guide
✅ No Action Needed If:
merge-multiple: trueas a workaroundYou download single artifacts by ID and your workflows expect the nested directory structure.
Before v5 (nested structure):
To maintain old behavior (if needed):
New Contributors
Full Changelog: actions/download-artifact@v4...v5.0.0
v5Compare Source
actions/upload-artifact (actions/upload-artifact)
v7.0.1Compare Source
What's Changed
Full Changelog: actions/upload-artifact@v7...v7.0.1
v7.0.0Compare Source
v7 What's new
Direct Uploads
Adds support for uploading single files directly (unzipped). Callers can set the new
archiveparameter tofalseto skip zipping the file during upload. Right now, we only support single files. The action will fail if the glob passed resolves to multiple files. Thenameparameter is also ignored with this setting. Instead, the name of the artifact will be the name of the uploaded file.ESM
To support new versions of the
@actions/*packages, we've upgraded the package to ESM.What's Changed
New Contributors
Full Changelog: actions/upload-artifact@v6...v7.0.0
v7Compare Source
v6.0.0Compare Source
v6 - What's new
Node.js 24
This release updates the runtime to Node.js 24. v5 had preliminary support for Node.js 24, however this action was by default still running on Node.js 20. Now this action by default will run on Node.js 24.
What's Changed
Full Changelog: actions/upload-artifact@v5.0.0...v6.0.0
v6Compare Source
v5.0.0Compare Source
What's Changed
BREAKING CHANGE: this update supports Node
v24.x. This is not a breaking change per-se but we're treating it as such.@actions/artifacttov4.0.0v5.0.0by @danwkennedy in #734New Contributors
Full Changelog: actions/upload-artifact@v4...v5.0.0
v5Compare Source
Configuration
📅 Schedule: (UTC)
🚦 Automerge: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you are satisfied.
♻ Rebasing: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.
👻 Immortal: This PR will be recreated if closed unmerged. Get config help if that's undesired.
This PR was generated by Mend Renovate. View the repository job log.