Fenrir 2026-06-02: TLS/DTLS correctness, resumption & renegotiation safety fixes by julek-wolfssl · Pull Request #10582 · wolfSSL/wolfssl

julek-wolfssl · 2026-06-03T10:56:11Z

Summary

Addresses ten Fenrir-tracked findings (TLS/DTLS correctness, session-resumption safety, renegotiation safety, and key hygiene). Each fix is its own commit, tagged with its F-<NUMBER>.

Fixes

F-3888 — Add negative tests for tampered RSA signatures/hashes in test_wolfSSL_RSA_verify and test_wolfSSL_RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS (PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS), guarding the XMEMCMP signature-acceptance check.
F-4867 — DoTls13EncryptedExtensions now rejects trailing bytes after the extensions block (length equality, RFC 8446 §4.3.1).
F-4868 — DoTls13CertificateRequest now rejects trailing bytes after the extensions block (RFC 8446 §4.3.2).
F-5633 — Zeroize DTLS 1.3 ChaCha record-number protection keys before freeing (FreeCiphers, plus the wc_Chacha_SetKey failure path).
F-5807 — Client enforces extended_master_secret consistency on resumption; abort on mismatch (RFC 7627 §5.3).
F-5810 — Server requires renegotiation_info on a renegotiation ClientHello and aborts if absent; also rejects an SCSV received during renegotiation (RFC 5746 §3.5/§3.7).
F-5811 — Client verifies the resumed cipher suite matches the cached session and aborts on mismatch (RFC 5246 §7.4.1.3).
F-5813 — BuildMessage refuses to emit a TLS 1.2 record once the write sequence number reaches its maximum, instead of silently wrapping (new SEQUENCE_NUMBER_E, RFC 5246 §6.1).
F-5818 — Invalidate the cached session on a fatal alert (receipt and transmission) so it cannot be resumed (RFC 5246 §7.2.2).
F-4144 — Honor WOLFSSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION: refuse peer-initiated renegotiation with a no_renegotiation warning while keeping the connection established, on both the client (HelloRequest) and server (renegotiation ClientHello) paths.

Tests

New memio regression tests in tests/api/test_tls_ext.c:

test_scr_no_renegotiation_option — server refuses renegotiation, stays established, and still passes application data.
test_helloRequest_no_renegotiation_option — client refuses a server HelloRequest, stays established, and still passes application data.

Both directions of post-refusal application data exchange are asserted.

Verification

./commit-tests.sh (current / --disable-fastmath / full configs) — all pass, 0 failures.
./configure --enable-all && make check — pass, 0 failures.
make check on a secure-renegotiation config (exercising the new SCR tests) — pass, 0 failures.

Copilot

Pull request overview

This PR addresses multiple Fenrir-tracked TLS/DTLS correctness and safety findings across parsing strictness, renegotiation handling, resumption validation, record-sequence hygiene, session cache invalidation on fatal alerts, key zeroization, and adds regression tests to prevent reintroduction.

Changes:

Tighten TLS 1.3 message parsing to reject trailing bytes after extension blocks (EncryptedExtensions, CertificateRequest).
Harden TLS 1.2 renegotiation and resumption behavior (NO_RENEGOTIATION option behavior, SCR renegotiation_info enforcement, EMS + cipher-suite consistency on resumption, refuse sequence-number wrap).
Add/extend regression tests (memio renegotiation refusal tests; RSA verify/PSS negative tamper tests) and improve DTLS 1.3 key hygiene (zeroization before free).

Reviewed changes

Copilot reviewed 10 out of 10 changed files in this pull request and generated 1 comment.

Show a summary per file

File	Description
wolfssl/internal.h	Extends secure renegotiation state with a new per-handshake `renegInfoSeen` flag and repacks SCR flags into bitfields.
wolfssl/error-ssl.h	Introduces `SEQUENCE_NUMBER_E` for TLS record sequence-number wrap prevention.
tests/api/test_tls_ext.h	Exposes new memio regression test prototypes for NO_RENEGOTIATION behavior.
tests/api/test_tls_ext.c	Adds client/server memio tests ensuring NO_RENEGOTIATION refuses renegotiation via warning alert while keeping the connection usable.
tests/api/test_ossl_rsa.c	Adds negative tamper tests for RSA v1.5 verify and RSA-PSS verification paths.
tests/api.c	Registers the new TLS extension regression tests in the main test list.
src/tls13.c	Enforces strict length equality for TLS 1.3 EncryptedExtensions and rejects trailing bytes in CertificateRequest.
src/tls.c	Tracks presence of `renegotiation_info` when parsing SCR extension in ClientHello.
src/internal.c	Implements NO_RENEGOTIATION warning behavior, SCR renegotiation checks, session invalidation on fatal alerts, TLS 1.2 record sequence wrap refusal, DTLS 1.3 ChaCha key zeroization, and resumption EMS/suite consistency checks.
src/dtls13.c	Zeroizes DTLS 1.3 record-number ChaCha context on `wc_Chacha_SetKey` failure before freeing.

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github-actions · 2026-06-03T13:22:54Z

retest this please

github-actions · 2026-06-03T13:46:49Z

MemBrowse Memory Report

gcc-arm-cortex-m0plus

FLASH: .text +20 B (+0.0%, 63,495 B / 262,144 B, total: 24% used)

gcc-arm-cortex-m3

FLASH: .text +136 B (+0.1%, 121,393 B / 262,144 B, total: 46% used)

gcc-arm-cortex-m4

FLASH: .rodata.wolfSSL_ERR_reason_error_string.str1.1 +34 B, .text +320 B (+0.2%, 199,056 B / 262,144 B, total: 76% used)

gcc-arm-cortex-m4-crypto-only

FLASH: .text +64 B (+0.0%, 173,614 B / 262,144 B, total: 66% used)

gcc-arm-cortex-m4-dtls13

FLASH: .text +192 B (+0.1%, 179,736 B / 1,048,576 B, total: 17% used)

gcc-arm-cortex-m4-openssl-compat

FLASH: .rodata +72 B, .text +1,152 B (+0.2%, 767,476 B / 1,048,576 B, total: 73% used)

gcc-arm-cortex-m4-pkcs7

FLASH: .text +320 B (+0.2%, 211,313 B / 262,144 B, total: 81% used)

gcc-arm-cortex-m4-pq

FLASH: .rodata +32 B, .text +576 B (+0.2%, 277,752 B / 1,048,576 B, total: 26% used)

gcc-arm-cortex-m4-rsa-only

FLASH: .rodata +32 B, .text +832 B (+0.3%, 323,480 B / 1,048,576 B, total: 31% used)

gcc-arm-cortex-m4-tls12

FLASH: .text +128 B (+0.1%, 122,125 B / 262,144 B, total: 47% used)

gcc-arm-cortex-m4-tls13

FLASH: .rodata.wolfSSL_ERR_reason_error_string.str1.1 +34 B, .text +192 B (+0.1%, 234,690 B / 262,144 B, total: 90% used)

gcc-arm-cortex-m7

FLASH: .rodata.wolfSSL_ERR_reason_error_string.str1.1 +34 B, .text +320 B (+0.2%, 199,056 B / 262,144 B, total: 76% used)

gcc-arm-cortex-m7-pq

FLASH: .rodata +32 B, .text +512 B (+0.2%, 278,328 B / 1,048,576 B, total: 27% used)

gcc-arm-cortex-m7-tls13

FLASH: .rodata.wolfSSL_ERR_reason_error_string.str1.1 +34 B, .text +192 B (+0.1%, 234,690 B / 262,144 B, total: 90% used)

linuxkm-pie

Data: __patchable_function_entries +56 B (+0.2%, 24,264 B)

linuxkm-standard

Data: __patchable_function_entries +56 B (+0.1%, 45,976 B)
No memory changes detected for:
gcc-arm-cortex-m4-baremetal
gcc-arm-cortex-m4-min-ecc
gcc-arm-cortex-m4-sp-math
stm32-sim-stm32h753

julek-wolfssl · 2026-06-04T15:30:49Z

Retest this please..

Extend test_wolfSSL_RSA_verify and test_wolfSSL_RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS with negative cases that flip a byte in the signature/encoding and in the hash, asserting verification fails. This guards the XMEMCMP-based signature acceptance decision in wolfSSL_RSA_verify_mgf against regressions that would let any decryption result of matching length pass as valid.

DoTls13EncryptedExtensions only bounds-checked the extensions length against the message size, silently ignoring any trailing bytes. RFC 8446 Section 4.3.1 defines the message as solely the extensions block, so enforce length equality and return BUFFER_ERROR (decode_error) on a mismatch.

DoTls13CertificateRequest advanced past the certificate_request_context and extensions blocks but never verified the whole message body was consumed, silently ignoring trailing bytes. RFC 8446 Section 4.3.2 fixes the wire format; enforce that the consumed length equals the message size and return BUFFER_ERROR (decode_error) otherwise.

FreeCiphers released the DTLS 1.3 record-number protection ChaCha contexts with XFREE only, leaving key material in freed heap memory. ForceZero both contexts before freeing, matching the regular TLS ChaCha path in FreeCiphersSide, and also zeroize a partially-set key in Dtls13InitChaChaCipher when wc_Chacha_SetKey fails.

CompleteServerHello's resumption branch derived keys from the cached master secret without checking the resumed session's extended_master_secret state against the abbreviated ServerHello, letting a MITM strip EMS on resumption. Per RFC 7627 Section 5.3, abort with a fatal handshake_failure when the cached session's EMS flag does not match the ServerHello EMS state.

On session-ID resumption the client only checked that the server's selected suite was in its offered list, not that it equaled the resumed session's suite, so a server could resume the session ID under a different cipher suite. Per RFC 5246 Section 7.4.1.2 / F.1.4 a resumed session reuses its negotiated suite; abort with a fatal illegal_parameter on mismatch.

GetSEQIncrement silently rolled the 64-bit write sequence counter from 2^64-1 back to 0, reusing sequence number 0 with the same keys. Per RFC 5246 Section 6.1 sequence numbers MUST NOT wrap. BuildMessage now refuses to emit a TLS 1.2 record once the write sequence number has reached its maximum, returning the new SEQUENCE_NUMBER_E error so the caller renegotiates or closes instead.

DoAlert marked a connection closed on a received fatal alert but left the established session in the resumption cache, and the send path did the same, so a session whose connection ended in a fatal alert remained resumable. Per RFC 5246 Section 7.2.2 the session identifier MUST be invalidated; evict the established session from the cache on both receipt and transmission of a fatal alert via the new InvalidateSessionOnFatalAlert helper.

The documented 'reject peer-initiated renegotiation' option was accepted and stored but never consulted. Now DoHelloRequest replies with a no_renegotiation warning instead of starting SCR when the bit is set (client side), and the server refuses a renegotiation ClientHello with a no_renegotiation warning instead of resetting handshake state.

The server validated client_verify_data only inside TLSX_SecureRenegotiation_Parse, which never runs when the renegotiation_info extension is absent, so a renegotiation ClientHello that omitted it was never checked. Track a per-handshake renegInfoSeen flag and, after parsing the renegotiation ClientHello extensions, abort with handshake_failure if the extension was absent (RFC 5746 3.7). Also reject an SCSV received during renegotiation (RFC 5746 3.5).

In the WOLFSSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION refusal path, WOLFSSL_LEAVE logged a hard-coded 0 while the function actually returned SendAlert()'s result. Capture the return value first so the trace reflects reality (e.g. when SendAlert fails due to write backpressure) and return it.

douzzer · 2026-06-08T20:26:08Z

analysis from Opus 4.8-High:

F-5811 / F-5807 skip ticket resumption. Both the suite-match and EMS checks are gated behind ssl->session->ticketLen == 0. For EMS this is well-justified (EAP-FAST PAC, stateless binding — the comment is right). For the cipher-suite check I'm less convinced: if the client retains session->cipherSuite0/cipherSuite for ticket-based sessions, then skipping the comparison leaves a downgrade gap symmetric to the session-ID hole F-5811 closes — a server could resume a ticket under a different (weaker) suite and the client wouldn't catch it. The "suite is bound in the ticket" rationale only constrains an honest server; the ticket is opaque to the client, so it can't independently enforce the binding except by comparing against its own retained session->cipherSuite.

Worth confirming whether ticket-resumed suite is validated elsewhere on the client path. If not, this is a candidate for a precise follow-up (apply the same cipherSuite0/cipherSuite comparison to the ticket path, leaving only the EMS skip ticket-gated).

julek-wolfssl · 2026-06-09T12:15:32Z

@douzzer addressed

The TLS 1.2 client only compared the ServerHello suite against the cached session suite for session-ID resumption; ticket resumption was skipped on the assumption the suite is bound in the ticket. But the ticket is opaque to the client, so it must enforce the match itself - otherwise a server could resume a ticket under a different (weaker) suite the client offered and the downgrade would go undetected (RFC 5246 7.4.1.3). The check is skipped only when the client retained no suite for the session (cipherSuite0/cipherSuite both zero), so there is nothing to compare against - as for EAP-FAST, whose PAC is a TLS ticket whose keys come from the session-secret callback and which never populates the cached suite. (0,0) is TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL, never negotiated, so it unambiguously means "no retained suite". The EMS check remains ticket-gated. Add memio regression tests: a ticket resumption under a different (retained) suite is rejected with MATCH_SUITE_ERROR, and a resumption whose cached suite was not retained still succeeds.

dgarske

Skoll Code Review

Scan type: reviewOverall recommendation: COMMENT
Findings: 8 total — 3 posted, 5 skipped
2 finding(s) posted as inline comments (see file-level comments below)

Posted findings

[Medium] Client-side EMS resumption check (server-drops-EMS direction) has no test — src/internal.c:32344-32360
[Medium] EMS resumption check excludes ALL ticket resumptions, asymmetric with the suite check — src/internal.c:32350-32360
[Low] Trailing-byte rejection returns BUFFER_ERROR without a TLS alert — src/tls13.c:6033, src/tls13.c:6171-6173

Skipped findings

[Low] ~~Fatal-alert session invalidation (F-5818) is untested on both send and receive paths~~
[Low] ~~TLS 1.3 send path evicts session only on alert_fatal, asymmetric with receive path~~
[Medium] ~~No negative tests for TLS 1.3 trailing-byte rejection (EncryptedExtensions / CertificateRequest)~~
[Low] ~~New brace-only block introduced solely to declare a variable in test~~
[Medium] ~~Most correctness fixes ship without dedicated regression tests~~

Review generated by Skoll

Copilot

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Address review on PR wolfSSL#10582: - The client-side extended_master_secret consistency check skipped all session-ticket resumptions, leaving a generic ticket resumption open to an undetected EMS downgrade by a malicious server or MITM. The client retains the EMS state for ticket sessions too (SetupSession), so the check now applies to ticket resumption as well, mirroring the adjacent cipher-suite check. Only EAP-FAST style resumption - where the session-secret callback supplies the master secret for an opaque PAC ticket - is exempt, matched precisely via ssl->sessionSecretCb just as the callback invocation in DoServerHello does. - Add test_tls_ems_resumption_server_downgrade, exercising the client-direction downgrade (server resumes but omits EMS from its ServerHello) for both session-ID and session-ticket resumption. This client-side branch previously had no test coverage.

dgarske · 2026-06-10T22:41:56Z

Jenkins retest this please: "Build 'PRB-valgrind-check-v3' failed with result: FAILURE" -> "[cd wolfssl && ../testing/Jenkins/PRB-valgrind-check-v3/valgrind-check.sh --enable-opensslall --enable-sniffer CPPFLAGS="-DWOLFSSL_OLD_PRIME_CHECK"]"

 Success -- All results as expected.
 End Cipher Suite Tests
unit_test: Success for all configured tests.
==23307== 
==23307== HEAP SUMMARY:
==23307==     in use at exit: 0 bytes in 0 blocks
==23307==   total heap usage: 2,363,029 allocs, 2,363,029 frees, 861,792,597 bytes allocated
==23307== 
==23307== All heap blocks were freed -- no leaks are possible
==23307== 
==23307== ERROR SUMMARY: 0 errors from 0 contexts (suppressed: 0 from 0)
Exiting with status: 3
Script ran for 646 seconds.
script returned exit code 3

douzzer · 2026-06-11T14:20:55Z

retest this please
(valgrind PRB failed, no logs)

dgarske

Skoll Code Review

Scan type: reviewOverall recommendation: REQUEST_CHANGES
Findings: 7 total — 5 posted, 2 skipped
5 finding(s) posted as inline comments (see file-level comments below)

Posted findings

[High] Client EMS/cipher-suite resumption checks fire on unconfirmed ticket resumption, breaking RFC 5077 ticket-decline fallback to full handshake — src/internal.c:32344-32395
[Medium] DoAlert invalidates the cached session before the alert is validated; forged TLS 1.3 plaintext alert evicts the session — src/internal.c:22596-22604
[Medium] test_tls12_resume_ticket_wrong_suite missing WOLFSSL_NO_DEF_TICKET_ENC_CB gate — tests/api/test_tls.c:889-896
[Low] Null-pointer checks in FreeCiphers use truthiness instead of explicit NULL comparison — src/internal.c:3346-3349
[Low] BuildMessage refuses the last RFC-legal sequence number (2^64-1) — src/internal.c:24717-24728

Skipped findings

[Medium] ~~No regression tests for F-4867, F-4868, F-5810, F-5813, F-5818, F-5633~~
[Low] ~~SecureRenegotiation struct: new member inserted mid-struct and existing byte fields converted to bitfields~~

Review generated by Skoll

dgarske

Please review skoll reports: #10582 (review)

The client's resumed-session EMS (F-5807) and cipher-suite (F-5811) checks were enforced in CompleteServerHello at ServerHello-parse time. For stateless ticket resumption the client sends an empty session ID and cannot yet tell whether the server accepted the ticket (RFC 5077 3.4): a server that declines the ticket falls back to a full handshake under a freshly negotiated suite/EMS state, which these checks wrongly aborted with MATCH_SUITE_ERROR, breaking the RFC 5077 ticket-decline fallback to a full handshake. Move both checks into CheckResumptionConsistency and run it only once resumption is confirmed - from whichever the server sends first in the abbreviated flight: a renewed NewSessionTicket (before SetupSession refreshes the cached suite/EMS to the current values) or its ChangeCipherSpec. By then the "Not resuming as thought" path has cleared 'resuming' for any ticket decline, so the full-handshake fallback proceeds. Add test_tls12_resume_ticket_decline_fallback (ticket declined by a fresh server CTX, full handshake under a different suite must succeed) and gate test_tls12_resume_ticket_wrong_suite on WOLFSSL_NO_DEF_TICKET_ENC_CB so it skips rather than fails in builds without the default ticket encryption callback.

DoAlert evicted the cached session from the fatal-alert handling that runs before the plaintext-under-encryption validation, so a forged TLS 1.3 plaintext alert injected on an established connection evicted the session (forcing a full handshake on reconnect) even though the alert is then rejected as PARSE_ERROR. The unexpected_message teardown sent in response also evicted through the SendAlert hook. Move the receive-side eviction past the validation, into the branch that processes a genuine alert, and have InvalidateSessionOnFatalAlert refuse to evict for a TLS 1.3 plaintext alert received while encryption is on (the current record was not decrypted) - covering both the receive path and the unexpected_message teardown sent in response. RFC 8446 6.2 does not require TLS 1.3 invalidation, so this loses nothing; TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246 7.2.2) is unaffected.

Use the project's preferred `ptr != NULL` form for the new DTLS 1.3 ChaCha record-number zeroization guards instead of relying on truthiness.

The sequence number 2^64-1 is itself RFC 5246 6.1-legal; only the wrap to 0 is forbidden. GetSEQIncrement reads the current counter then post-increments it, so the check refuses the final legal sequence number to avoid the wrapping post-increment. Document that this last value is deliberately sacrificed rather than implying 2^64-1 is itself unusable.

Copilot AI review requested due to automatic review settings June 3, 2026 10:56

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julek-wolfssl added 4 commits June 11, 2026 19:22

F-5633: use explicit NULL comparison in FreeCiphers

108afdf

Use the project's preferred `ptr != NULL` form for the new DTLS 1.3 ChaCha record-number zeroization guards instead of relying on truthiness.

julek-wolfssl requested a review from dgarske June 11, 2026 19:28

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dgarske merged commit 29f14ed into wolfSSL:master Jun 11, 2026
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