Repository navigation
feat: add dependabot, security policy, and release attestation - #6
Merged
Merged
Conversation
igorjs
force-pushed
the
feat/enterprise-hardening-s5-drift-detection
branch
2 times, most recently
from
September 7, 2026 04:27
b01dd29 to
2abfd46
Compare
Signed-off-by: igorjs <2278164+igorjs@users.noreply.github.com>
Signed-off-by: igorjs <2278164+igorjs@users.noreply.github.com>
On a version tag push, archive the tagged tree with git archive, attest it via actions/attest-build-provenance, then create a GitHub Release with the archive attached. Deviations from the WU-13 brief found during verification: - actions/checkout needs no with: overrides. actions/checkout fetches the exact ref that triggered the workflow by default, and on a push: tags: trigger that ref is refs/tags/<tag> itself, so the tag is already resolvable locally for git archive without fetch-depth: 0 or fetch-tags: true. Verified against actions/checkout v7.0.1 source (ref-helper.ts, input-helper.ts) and README. - Added artifact-metadata: write to the job permissions. attest-build-provenance v4.2.2 wraps actions/attest@v4.2.1 internally, whose own README lists id-token: write, attestations: write, and artifact-metadata: write as the permissions to set, a set the brief's list was missing one of. Signed-off-by: igorjs <2278164+igorjs@users.noreply.github.com>
igorjs
force-pushed
the
feat/enterprise-hardening-s6-provenance
branch
from
September 7, 2026 04:28
3a7b1df to
d06111b
Compare
igorjs
changed the base branch from
feat/enterprise-hardening-s5-drift-detection
to
main
September 7, 2026 04:28
Add Supply chain README section covering Dependabot cadence, the SECURITY.md link, and the release attestation's scope and limits. Document the manual tag-protection follow-up for v1 in README and CHANGELOG. Add matching CHANGELOG entries for dependabot, SECURITY.md, and the release workflow. Remove the unused artifact-metadata: write permission from release.yml: push-to-registry stays unset and the permission was never exercised, resolving the self-contradiction the prior pass's own comment already admitted. Add enabling GitHub's private vulnerability reporting to the pre-v1 manual checklist in CHANGELOG, since SECURITY.md documents it as the disclosure channel but the toggle isn't on by default. Signed-off-by: igorjs <2278164+igorjs@users.noreply.github.com>
igorjs
force-pushed
the
feat/enterprise-hardening-s6-provenance
branch
from
September 7, 2026 05:01
d06111b to
f27ae4e
Compare
igorjs
marked this pull request as ready for review
September 7, 2026 05:02
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
Summary
Pinned actions can drift silently with no automated check, there was no clear channel for reporting a vulnerability, and a tagged release had no way to prove what actually produced it. This closes that gap: dependency updates, a disclosure path, and a release attestation.
What Changed
.github/dependabot.yml, weeklygithub-actionsecosystem checks covering the pinned SHAs in bothaction.ymland the workflow files.SECURITY.md, documents how to verify a SHA pin against its tag yourself and points to GitHub's private vulnerability reporting for disclosures. No email address anywhere, reports go through GitHub only..github/workflows/release.yml, triggers on av*tag push, archives the tagged tree, attests it withactions/attest-build-provenance, and creates a GitHub Release from that archive.Notes for reviewers
v1is tagged, enable tag protection onv*in the repo's Settings (Rulesets or tag protection). No workflow or Terraform can do this, it's a Settings change.release.ymlhasn't been exercised against a real tag yet. Before tagging the realv1, push a throwaway pre-release tag likev0.0.0-testto confirm the archive, attestation, and release creation work end to end, then delete it.tests/action-logic.shbundles four unrelated test concerns into one file, boundary test coverage is asymmetric between the r2 and s3 credential checks, and there are a handful of lower-priority test-assertion-strength gaps. None of these block the stack, they're tracked as follow-ups.Related work