Fix script injection GitHub actions#237
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Unit Tests Coverage Report
Minimum allowed coverage is Generated by 🐒 cobertura-action against cb3ec54 |
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Issue #, if available:
Description of changes:
This commit fixes a script injection vulnerability in the GitHub Actions workflow by changing how PR number and SHA are extracted. Instead of directly interpolating
${{ github.event.* }}expressions (which can be exploited by malicious input), it now safely reads from the$GITHUB_EVENT_PATHJSON file usingjq. The values are still sanitized withtrto strip unwanted characters before being written to files.Why is this change necessary:
When GitHub Actions expressions like
${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}are interpolated directly into shell scripts or environment variables, an attacker who controls the value (e.g., via a crafted PR branch name or title) could inject malicious shell commands that execute during the workflow run. This is a well-known GitHub Actions vulnerability called "script injection."By reading from
$GITHUB_EVENT_PATHand parsing withjq, the data is treated as a literal string rather than being interpreted by the shell—preventing any embedded commands from executing. This is the recommended mitigation from GitHub's security documentation for handling untrusted input in workflows.How was this change tested:
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