fix: Secure unauthenticated proof status update#15
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LSUDOKO wants to merge 1 commit intoc2siorg:mainfrom
Open
fix: Secure unauthenticated proof status update#15LSUDOKO wants to merge 1 commit intoc2siorg:mainfrom
LSUDOKO wants to merge 1 commit intoc2siorg:mainfrom
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Description
This PR addresses a critical security vulnerability where the
POST /update-proof-statusendpoint (and other sensitive state-mutating endpoints) in thelensmint-public-serverlacked any form of authentication.Previously, a malicious actor could bypass the Zero-Knowledge proof generation process by calling the endpoint and marking an unverified image's claim ID as "verified" with a fake transaction hash.
Changes Made:
Authorization: Bearer <API_SECRET>header and rejects unauthorized requests with a401 Unauthorizederror.Authorizationheader containing theAPI_SECRETto all outgoing requests.Impact & Security Gains
/create-claim,/update-proof-status,/update-claim-status, and others are now fully protected.API_SECRETenvironment variable in both the server's.envand the client's.envfiles.Proof of Fix
When a malicious actor attempts to send a forged request without the
Authorizationheader, the server now correctly blocks the payload:Malicious Request:
Server Response (Successfully Blocked):
When an authorized client (like our hardware-web3-service) sends a request with the correct secret, it processes correctly.
fixes #11