patching dependabot workflow to address security risk#390
patching dependabot workflow to address security risk#390
Conversation
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Thank you for your contribution @micahwiesner67 🚀! Your pkgdown-site is ready for download 👉 here 👈! |
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This workflow will not run if you change pull_request_target to pull_request |
Why not? We use on.pull_request.branches.main in other workflows |
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The pull_request_target functionality was used as it grants write permissions to the dependabot to update the NEWS.md file and push that change back to the repo. |
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Why don't we drop the workflow and the NEWS.md file? We didn't end up doing releases in this repo/package and documenting release notes in the R package is the main purpose of the file. |
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I'm fine with that |
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After initially talking with Katie and Gio, I believe we all agreed there isn't really a risk b/c of the github actor field / way this workflow is setup there are no secrets exposed and a fork wouldn't actually allow anyone to willy-nilly trigger this run (only the dependabot author can trigger this workflow) and again no secrets are exposed. That being said, if we don't want to support the NEWS.md file as it's excessive, I am glad to remove. I will remove the NEWS.md file and the dependabot workflow and wait for input from others (we can pull in or decide this isn't the approach we want to use). Note: this workflow can't be replaced with pull_request (opposed to pull_request_target). |
Boris showed me some LLM output demonstrating how there could be potential vulnerabilities in this workflow. ChatGPT made these suggestions and they look sound to me, though I'm not sure how to test them.
The changes include:
pull_requestinstead ofpull_request_targetto perform processing on the trusted main branchenv.TITLEinstead of setting the variable in bashSupersedes #389